Federal district judge Reed O’Connor rules that the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 violates the Second Amendment.

Defendants argue that the federal interstate handgun transfer ban imposes only minimal burdens, so heightened scrutiny is not warranted…. Defendants rely on the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2012), which held that heightened scrutiny is reserved for regulations that “substantially” burden the Second Amendment right…. Under this standard, a plaintiff may rebut the presumption that a longstanding regulation is presumptively lawful by showing that the regulation has more than a de minimis effect upon his right; “[a] requirement of newer vintage is not, however, presumed to be valid.” [Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011)]. As discussed above, the federal interstate handgun transfer ban is not longstanding, making the de minimis standard inappplicable….

At its core, the Second Amendment protectslaw-abiding, responsible citizens. Instead of limiting the federal interstate handgun transfer ban to a discrete class of people, it prevents all legally responsible and qualified individuals from directly acquiring handguns from FFLs [federal firearms licensees] in every state other than their state of residency and the District of Columbia…. To obtain a handgun from an out-of-state [ retailer, the federal interstate handgun transfer ban imposes substantial additional time and expense to those who desire to purchase one. Restricting the distribution channels of legal goods protected by the Constitution to a small fraction of the total number of possible retail outlets requires a compelling interest that is narrowly tailored. See Carey [ v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977)], [United States v.] Marzzarella, 614 F.3d [85,  94] (“[I]nfringements on protected rights can be, depending on the facts, as constitutionally suspect as outright bans.”). The Court, therefore, applies strict scrutiny—that is, the law must be narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).

Source:  http://althouse.blogspot.com/2015/02/federal-district-judge-reed-oconnor.html

1 Comment

  1. Geoff on February 16, 2015 at 8:33 am

    Wow! a Judge that understands what “shall not be infringed” actually means.